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Case No. 20050720-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Mynor Armando Ardon-Aguirre, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for manslaughter, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (West 2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Was defendant's trial counsel constitutionally ineffective in permitting 
defendant to be sentenced on the same day he entered a guilty plea and in 
permitting defendant to provide his account of what led to the fatal shooting of 
Oscar Arrieta? 
Standard of Review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,16,89 
P.3d 162. However, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 22(a) 
Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, 
the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall not be less 
than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the 
court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. 
Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may 
continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show legal cause why sentence should 
not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of 
sentence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Defendant was charged by criminal information with the murder of Oscar 
Arrieta. R. 1-2,51-52. Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over 
to stand trial as charged. PH; R. 53-55. Defendant averted a trial on the murder 
charge when, pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to an amended charge of 
manslaughter. R. 53-55, 78-79, 85-94; PH. In doing so, defendant acknowledged 
that on March 27, 2005, he agreed to fight with the victim later that day at a 
prearranged location; he arrived for the fight armed with a .22 caliber pistol; and 
1
 This "Statement of the Case" includes both a summary of the proceedings 
and a summary of the underlying facts, as described by the prosecutor and affirmed 
by defendant when the prosecutor provided a factual basis for the plea. Because the 
transcripts in this case were not paginated when the record was indexed, the July 21, 
2005 hearing (where defendant pled guilty and was sentenced) is cited as "SH." The 
preliminary hearing transcript is cited as "PH." 
2 
after being choked, he drew the pistol and fired four shots into the victim, one of 
which entered the victim's back, penetrated vital organs, and caused the victim's 
death. SH: 7. After conducting a rule 11 colloquy to ensure that defendant's plea 
was knowing and voluntary, the trial court accepted his guilty plea. SH: 3-8. 
After accepting defendant's plea, the court advised defendant that if he 
"desire[d] to withdraw that plea [he] must file a written motion with the court prior 
to [his] sentencing and show that [his] plea was not knowingly and voluntarily 
made." SH: 8. The court then advised defendant that he had "the right to wait to be 
sentenced." He was informed that the law required the judge to wait two days 
before sentencing him "unless [he was] willing to waive that right and be sentenced 
[that day]." SH: 8. After noting that defense counsel had previously notified the 
judge that defendant wished to be sentenced that day, the court asked, "Do you 
want to be sentenced today?" SH: 8. Defendant responded, "Yes." SH: 8. After 
hearing from the victim's father and allowing defendant to make a statement in 
allocution, the district court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of 
one-to-fifteen years. R. 95-97; SH: 61. The court also ordered that defendant be 
delivered to the Department of Homeland Security for deportation proceedings 
after his release from prison. R. 96; SH: 62. Defendant timely appealed. R. 99-100. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion on appeal, Aplt. Brf. at 6, the trial court 
provided a Spanish interpreter for defendant in all but one hearing attended by 
defendant. See R. 5,7,43,47,53,63,74,95. In the only hearing where an interpreter 
is not identified in the record, the trial court simply continued the preliminary 
3 
hearing, at defense counsel's request. See R. 38-39. The minutes indicate that an 
interpreter was used at the July 21, 2005 hearing, in which defendant pled guilty 
and was sentenced. See R. 95; see also SH: 6 (trial court asking whether there was any 
interference with the interpretation). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel because he allowed him to be sentenced immediately following entry of his 
plea and his statement in allocution. Defendant's claim fails at the outset because 
nothing in the record suggests that counsel did not advise defendant not to proceed 
with sentencing or give a detailed allocution. Defendant's claim rests in part on the 
contention that the single hearing disposition precluded defendant from his right to 
withdraw his plea. Defendant, however, does not have a right to withdraw his plea. 
A plea may only be withdrawn upon a showing that it was not entered knowingly 
or voluntarily. Defendant has made no such showing. Defendant's claim also rests 
on the contention that his statement in allocution should not have been given on the 
same day of sentencing. This claim fails because such an allocution is required to be 
made before sentencing. In any event, defendant has shown no prejudice. Absent 
any alleged error, there is no reasonable probability that defendant would have been 
given probation for manslaughter rahter than sentenced to prison. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
Defendant contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective 
because he permitted him to enter a guilty plea and be sentenced, "all in the same 
hearing." Aplt. Brf. at 9. He contends that the single hearing disposition deprived 
him of (1) his "right to withdraw his plea," and (2) his right to "be sentenced at a 
time where the judge may have had more information about the Defendant, and the 
emotional state of the Judge, with regard to Defendant's acts, would have had time 
to wear off." Aplt. Brf. at 9. Defendant's argument is frivolous. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
satisfy the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 
(1984). He must demonstrate that (1) "counsel's performance was deficient," and (2) 
"the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. Defendant makes 
neither showing. 
A. A motion to withdraw the guilty plea would have been futile. 
Defendant first contends that by permitting him to be sentenced immediately 
following the plea, trial counsel "failed to preserve [his] right to withdraw his plea." 
Aplt. Brf. at 9. He argues that he was thus "unable to reconsider his position, 
withdraw his plea, and go to trial and tell his story of self-defense." Aplt. Brf. at 13, 
15. This claim lacks merit. 
The "withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege, not a right." State v. 
Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040,1041 (Utah 1987). The purpose of allowing a defendant to 
5 
withdraw his guilty plea is not to enable him to "reconsider" his decision. Aplt. Brf. 
at 13, 15. Rather, it "is to permit him to undo a plea which was unknowingly, 
unintelligently, or involuntarily made." Gallegos, 738 P.2d at 1041. Thus, "[a] plea of 
guilty... may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was 
not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West 2004) 
(emphasis added). 
In this case, defendant has made no claim that the plea was made 
unknowingly or involuntarily. To the contrary, defendant concedes that the trial 
court "carefully addressed the issue of whether [he] had willingly entered his plea 
of 'guilty.'" Aplt. Brf. at 10. Indeed, a review of the record establishes that 
defendant was fully advised of his constitutional rights to a trial verdict, as 
contained in rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that he knowingly and 
voluntarily waived those rights. The court's compliance with rule 11 created a 
presumption that defendant's plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. See 
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 11,1 P.3d 1108. 
The trial court discussed the constitutional rights to a trial verdict with 
defendant at the July 21,2005 hearing. SH: 3-8. During that hearing, defendant also 
signed a plea affidavit, written in Spanish, that fully explained those rights. R. 85-
94; SH: 8. The court properly incorporated that plea affidavit. Defendant affirmed 
to the court that he reads and speaks the Spanish language and that he had read the 
affidavit or had it read to him at least three times. SH: 4-5. He affirmed that he 
understood the affidavit and did not have any questions about it. SH: 5. He also 
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affirmed that he understood that by pleading guilty he was giving up all of those 
constitutional rights, as explained by the court and in the plea affidavit. SH: 6. 
Thereafter, defendant affirmed that no promises were made in exchange for his 
guilty plea and that no one was forcing him to plead guilty. SH: 6. Defendant also 
attested that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty. Finally, defendant 
agreed with the prosecutor's factual basis for the charge, affirming that he shot the 
victim four times with a .22 caliber pistol, twice in the back, causing the victim's 
death. SH: 7. 
Because defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty, he had no basis for 
filing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The law is well settled that "the failure 
of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised does not 
constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982); 
accord State v. Atkin, 2006 UT App 155, \ 15,135 P.3d 894.2 Accordingly, counsel did 
not perform deficiently in allowing defendant to be sentenced immediately after 
2
 Counsel's decision not to act in such cases cannot be considered deficient, 
nor can such failure be said to result in any prejudice. 
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entry of the plea (to the extent counsel can even be held responsible for defendant's 
decision to be sentenced immediately following his plea).3 
B. Counsel was not ineffective in "allowing" defendant's statement 
in allocution immediately after the plea but before sentencing. 
Defendant also contends that counsel was ineffective in allowing him to 
waive the time for sentencing because the judge's "emotional state," caused by 
defendant's allocution, did not have any "time to wear off." Aplt. Brf. at 9. 
Defendant argues that "the trial court needed a 'cooling off period, to regain some 
sense of independence from the emotion of the minute." Aplt. Brf. at 11. He 
reasons that because "[j]udges are human,. . . we [should] presume that they need 
time to absorb what they have heard and give it appropriate weight after the 
emotion has faded away." Aplt. Brf. at 13. He concludes that "[cjounsel's decision 
directly affected the sentence, as it put the judge in the position of having to issue a 
sentence without having any time to completely shed the emotional response to a 
horrible situation." Aplt. Brf. at 14. Defendant's argument lacks merit. 
Defendant's argument fails at the outset because it relies on two unsupported 
factual assertions: (1) that counsel "encouraged, rather than discouraged, 
3
 Defendant claims that the court "did not address the fact the [sic] immediate 
sentencing would deprive [him] of his right to withdraw his plea and go to trial." 
Aplt. Brf. at 10-11. To the contrary, the court specifically advised defendant that if 
he wished to withdraw his plea, he "must file a written motion with the court prior 
to [his] sentencing and show that [his] plea was not knowingly and voluntarily 
made." SH: 8. Having been thus informed, defendant was well aware that in 
agreeing to be sentenced that day, he would forego an opportunity to move for the 
withdrawal of his plea. 
8 
[defendant] to be sentenced immediately following his allocution," Aplt. Brf. at 10, 
and (2) that counsel made "no attempt to prevent" him from unnecessarily 
incriminating himself by making a statement that "went far beyond what is required 
to accept a plea agreement," Aplt. Brf. at 9. Nothing in the record supports these 
assertions. As such, this Court must presume that counsel properly advised 
defendant on both of these issues. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (holding that 
"counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all 
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment").4 Having 
failed to establish that counsel's performance was deficient, defendant's 
ineffectiveness claim fails. 
Defendant ineffectiveness claim also fails because it confuses defendant's 
statement, made pursuant to rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, with a so-
called "plea allocution," which is offered to satisfy the "factual basis" requirement 
of rule 11. Defendant complains that his trial counsel allowed him to give a 
For purposes of resolving defendant's argument only, this Court may thus 
presume that counsel did in fact discourage him from waiving the time for 
sentencing and from giving a lengthy allocution detailing the events surrounding 
the homicide. This presumption, however, does not suggest that contrary advice 
would have necessarily constituted ineffective assistance. Indeed, there are sound 
reasons for a defendant to be candid with the court prior to sentencing. As observed 
by the Utah Supreme Court, continued claims of innocence after a guilty verdict 
"may offend or disturb the sentencer, who must consider factors such as a 
defendant's acceptance of personal responsibility and willingness to be 
rehabilitated." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, f 56, 63 P.3d 621. Agreeing to be 
sentenced immediately might also demonstrate a willingness to accept 
responsibility without excuse. 
9 
statement that "went far beyond what is required to accept a plea agreement/' Aplt. 
Brf. at 9. The statement, however, was not a "plea allocution" and had nothing to 
do with the acceptance of defendant's guilty plea. 
Under rule 11, the trial court may not accept a guilty plea unless it finds 
"there is a factual basis for the plea." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(b). In this case, the 
trial court asked the prosecutor, rather than defendant, to provide a factual basis for 
the plea. SH: 7. After the prosecutor did so, defendant agreed that "that [is] what 
happened." SH: 7. Defendant's subsequent statement, to which he now finds fault, 
served a different purpose. The statement was made under rule 22(a), which 
"codifies the common-law right of allocution, allowing a defendant to make a 
statement in mitigation or explanation after conviction but before sentencing." State v. 
Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, f 18, 79 P.3d 937 (emphasis added).5 Defendant's complaint 
that his statement "went far beyond what is required to accept a plea agreement" 
thus misses the mark. Aplt. Brf. at 9. The statement was not given to satisfy the 
"factual basis" requirement for taking a plea. Rather, it was given in response to the 
court's allocution offer under rule 22. See SH: 13. 
Under rule 22, the trial court was required to "afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement" in allocution "[b]efore imposing sentence." Utah 
R. Crim. P. 22(a). Therefore, even had defendant been sentenced at a later date, his 
5
 Rule 22 provides: "Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the 
defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be 
imposed." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). 
10 
statement in allocution still would have occurred at the sentencing hearing. The 
judge thus would still be subject to the "emotional" reaction arising from the facts of 
the case. 
Moreover, trial counsel cannot be faulted for not "jump[ing] up and tell[ing] 
the Defendant he had said enough." Aplt. Brf. at 11. The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that "[allocution is an 'inseparable part' of the right to appear and defend in 
person guaranteed by the Utah Constitution." Maestas, 2002 UT 123, % 48 (quoting 
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109-10 (Utah 1996)). The allocution decision, 
therefore, rests with defendant. Counsel was in no position to prevent defendant 
from exercising his "constitutionally guaranteed right to allocution" before 
sentencing. Maestas, 2002 UT 123,148. 
* * * 
Even assuming arguendo that counsel's performance was deficient, defendant 
cannot show prejudice. Defendant claims that "the judge may have had more 
information about [him]" had sentencing been scheduled for a later date. Aplt. Brf. 
at 9. However, he does not suggest what that information might be, nor does he 
explain how it would have affected the court's determination. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694. The sentencing guidelines recommend imprisonment for manslaughter, even 
when there are no other aggravating factors. See Utah Court Rules Annotated, 
Appx. D, at 1567 (2004). Moreover, the trial court is entitled, if not obligated, to 
consider the nature and circumstances of the offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
402(1) (West 2004). Defendant pled guilty to killing a man. With or without 
11 
defendant's elaboration, and whether sentencing occurred immediately following 
the plea or days or weeks thereafter, it cannot be said that absent any alleged error, 
a "reasonable probability" exists that "the result of the proceeding would have been 
different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted September 1,2006. 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
^ftrey S. Gray ^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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